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Donley: The Sole Beneficiary Problem in West Virginia
THE SOLE BENEFICIARY PROBLEM IN WEST VIRGINIA
ROBERT

T. Do.y *

T

HE unique statute in West Virginia permits the "sole" beneficiary of a promise2 to maintain an action at law thereon,
whether the promise is sealed or unsealed and without his having
furnished the consideration or being in contractual privity with the
promisor.' This ill-chosen word created the problem of definition:
Who is the "sole" beneficiary? It has resulted in conflicting ideas
and expressions which it is the purpose of this paper to examine.
It will be assumed that the reader is familiar, in a general way,
with the peculiar doctrines applicable to third-party beneficiary
contracts and with the modern classification 4 which defines the
beneficiary as either (a) a donee; or (b) a creditor; or (c) an
incidental beneficiary.
The English common-law rule denied the beneficiary any enforceable rights, either at law or in equity, save in exceptional
cases where a trust or other special relationship existed or was
Member of the Monongalia county bar; assistant professor of law, West
Virginia University, 1934-1937; instructor in law, 1942-1943.
I So far as the writer has been able to determine, no other state now has
a statute conferring rights upon a "sole"
beneficiary. The Virginia statute was amended in VA. CODE (1919) § 5143.
2 Note that the statute does not use the word "contract".
3W.VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 8, § 12: "If a covenant or promise
be made for the sole benefit of a person with whom it is not made, or with
whom it is made jointly with others, such person may maintain, in his own
name, any action thereon which he might maintain in case it had been made
with him only, and the consideration had moved from him to the party making
such covenant or promise." See Notes (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 312 and (1926)
32 W. VA. L. Q. 342.
4 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 133:
"(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person
other than the promisce, that person is, except as stated in Subsection (3):
"(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the aceompanying circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of
the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to
confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promise to
the beneficiary:
"(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from
the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances
and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed
or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or right of the
beneficiary against the promisee which has been' barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy, or which is
unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds;
"(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a)
nor those stated in Clause (b) exists."
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invented as a fiction.5 Various reasons were advanced in support
of this denial: (a) that it would be a "monstrous proposition"
to say that a person was a party to the contract for the purpose
of suing but not for being sued;6 (b) that only an actual party to
a contract may sue upon it; (c) that consideration must move
from the party entitled to sue. These rules have been explained
as being based upon the procedural limitations of the action of
assumpsit; the argument being that prior to the development of
that form of action the beneficiary had a 7substantive right enforceable in an action of debt or of account.
Whatever the historical truth may be,8 the English view
was perpetuated in Virginia and enunciated in 1841 in the case
of Ross v. Miie.9 In holding that an action of debt would not lie
upon the donee type of sealed indenture, or upon a parol contract
to the same effect, the court relied upon the English doctrines
previously mentioned and also advanced other reasons in support
of its views. It was said that since the promisee could sue, if
the beneficiary were also permitted an action the promisor would
either be charged twice or the court would be compelled to stay
one of the actions. As to the parol contract, the court wandered
into a discussion of unexecuted gifts and the nonassignability at
law of choses in action, treating the contract as a mere revocable
order by the promisee to the promisor to pay money to the beneficiary. It was called an "oral chose in action" which even an
assignee for value-much less a donee-could not enforce in his
own name. The court concluded that the donee had no right, but
assuming that he did, they were enforceable only in a court of
equity.
The inconvenienees and injustices resulting, presumably, from
this decision. led to a statutory modification in 1849,10 which
was in turn carried verbatim into the West Virg'inia Code of 186011
and perpetuated without change ever since and appears in the
Revised Code, 55-8-12.
2 WrLmISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 360.
c Crompton, J., in Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith 398 (1816).
7 Hening, History of the Beneficiary's Action in Assumpsit (1909) 3 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANTGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 339.
8 See Williston's comment on Hening's argument, 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
1033-4.
9 12 Leigh 204 (Va. 1841).
lo Chapter 116, § 2. Johnson, P., took this view in Johnson v. MeClung,
26 W. Va. 659, 666 (1885).
11 Chapter 116, § 2.,
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Analysis of the language of this statute indicates that the
legislature had at least five objects in view: (1) by the use of
the word "covenant" to change the rule that only the parties to
a sealed indenture (as distinguished from a deed-poll) could sue
upon it; (2) to permit a joint promisee to sue without the joinder
of his copromisees, where the joint promisee was actually a party
to a contract which was made for his sole benefit; (3) by permitting action "in his own name" to overcome the objection mentioned in Ross v. Milne as to the nonenforceability at law of choses
in action in the name of the assignee; (4) to change the rule that
the consideration must move from the plaintiff; and (5) to abolish
the doctrine of privity of contract.
Furthermore, by the use of the word "action" rather than
"suit", it seems reasonably clear that the intent was to afford
the sole beneficiary a remedy in an action at law, and to leave
untouched any relief that he might have in a court of equity, as
indicated by the dictum in Ross v. Milne. However, if the promise
calls for nothing but the payment of money by the promisor to
the beneficiary, under circumstances not within traditional equity
jurisdiction it is arguable that equity should refuse relief for
the reason that the plaintiff has a full, complete and adequate
remedy at law. 12 If this contention is upheld, then in such types
of cases the words "may maintain" would be construed as
"must maintain". Finally, as a matter of construction, one who
is not a "sole" beneficiary may not maintain an action at law
because the statute does not permit him to do so, and the rule
of Ross v. Mlne, that he has no such right at common law would
remain unchanged.
The statute thus solved some problems, but created new ones
by the omission to define what is meant by the word "sole". This
is gradually and haphazardly being determined by the process
of inclusion and exclusion. Certain kinds of beneficiaries have
been excluded from the definition. Thus, in the familiar type
12 In Blanton v. Keneipp, et al., 155 Va. 668, 156 S. E. 413 (1931),
the
Virginia court, construing the amended statute, held that it did not preclude
a suit in equity by a mortgagee against a grantee assuming payment of the
mortgage, on the theory of adequate remedy at law. In such cases the liability of the promisor is based upon the equitable doctrine of subrogation
and not upon privity of contract or upon the furnishing'of the consideration.
But the court refused to exTress an opinion as to whether the plaintiff could
have maintained an action at law. If so, it is merely cumulative and does
not oust traditional equity jurisdiction.
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of creditor beneficiary contract, 3 the creditor is not the sole beneficiary foe' the reason that the debtor-promisee also benefits pecuniarily by having his debt paid by the promisor, even though
the debtor has become a bankrupt.34 The Virginia court has construed the identical statute in a number of cases. In one case
it was said that it must appear that the covenant was made for
the benefit of the person bringing the action.'5 In another, it
was held that there might be successive sole beneficiaries of an insurance policy.1" The sole beneficiary must be "plainly designated by the instrament" the extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to
show that the covenant was made solely for the plaintiff's benefit,
since this would violate the parol evidence rule."7 In one case,
the court seems to employ the test of the subjective intent of the
promisee to benefit the beneficiary rather than the objective
effect of the benefit.' Apparently, the test to determine the party
to be benefited is made as of the time of the formation of the
contract, notwithstanding the fact that later events may render
the performance pecuniarily beneficial both to the promisee and
to the beneficiary. 9
13 Johnson v. 'McClung, 26 W. Va. 659 (1885); King v. Scott, 76 W. Va.
58, 84 S. E. 954 (1915); Petty v. Warren, 90 W. Va. 397, 110 S. E. 826
(1922); Hamilton v. Wheeling Public Service Co., 88 V. Va. 573, 107 S. E.
For additional cases see RESTATFMENT, CONTRACTS. W. VA.
401 (1921).
ANNOT. (1938) § § 133-144.
14 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F.
(2d) 988 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937),
construing XV. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 8, § 12. This was an action
at law upon a group indemnity policy issued by the defendant to a medical
society of which doctor H was a member. The plaintiff recovered a judgment
against H in a malpractice suit and H became bankrupt. Held, plaintiff cannot maintain an action at law upon the policy. This is a well considered
case and collects many authorities. See Note (1937) 44 W. VA. L. Q. 149.
15 Stuart v. James River, etc. Co., 24 Graft. 294 (Va. 1874).
16 Clemnimit, et al. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355 (1882). (Defendant
issued a life insurance policy to M. payable to TV, his wrife, if she be living;
if not, to her children. Plaintiff was her only child. D repudiated the policy
in 1856. The wife dlied in 1868. M died irn 1877. Held, P may maintain an
action at law. The insurance was for the benefit of the wife and children not
jointly, but separately and contingently.)
17 Newberry Land Co. v. Newberry, 95 Va. 119, 27 S. E. 899 (1897).
3sCasselman's Adm'x v. Gordon & Lightfoot, 118 Va. 553, 88 S. E. 58
(1916). Real estate was conveyed to one who did not assume payment of
encumbering deeds of trust. He, in turn, conveyed to D who assumed payment. Held, the holder of the notes can maintain action at law against D.
This conclusion treats the owner of the notes as a donee beneficiary. The
weight of authority is contra. See 2 WILTSTON, CONTRACTS 1322.
19 Tilley v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 861 Va. 811. 11 S. E. 120 (1890). This
case upheld an action at law upon a fire insurance policy issued by D, payable to P, morl gagee, as his interest might appear. The debt exceeded the
face amount of the policy. The court said that P was the sole beneficiary of
the policy. This would seem to ignore the fact that, had the debt been
reduced by partial payment to an amount less than the face of the policy,
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Respectable authorities construing the statuite have said that
"the term 'sole beneficiary' . . was orginally created to designate
a donee beneficiary".2
This, however, does not solve the problem where, in an admittedly donee case, there are two or more
persons who are named beneficiaries or who are members of a
designated class. In brief, is the word "sole" synonymous with
the word "single"?
To this question seemingly contradictory
answers have been made which, however, it is believed, can be
reconciled.
In Jenkins v. C. & 0. Ry., 1 the defendant promised a county
court to transport to a pesthouse all persons suffering from smallpox. The plaintiff having contracted the disease, was placed by
the defendant in an unheated box car and transported to the
pesthouse, but his feet were frozen because of failure to heat
the car. The court held that the plaintiff could maintain an action
of assumpsit. In support of its decision the court, without comment or analysis, cited the statute, two West Virginia cases not in
point,2 2 and Ross v. Milne. It then said: "This doctrine has been
extended, by persuasive authority, to one of a class of persons
where the class is sufficiently designated."
There was no discussion of the question whether a member of a class comes within the meaning of the words "the sole beneficiary," but the
decision must be considered as a tacit holding to that effect.
A similar decision was rendered in Meadows v. McCullougi,2'
in which the court upheld the right of an employee to sue at law
upon a contract between the defendant and the employer whereby
the former promised to furnish hospital treatment to the employees,
each of whom contributed to the fund paid to the defendant.
This is a stronger case because the consideration moved, in part,
from the plaintiff to the defendant. The point here questioned was
not discussed, the court contenting itself with the statement that
it would also have been for the benefit of the insured. See discussion in 2
WILISTONT, CONTRACTS § 401A; cf. Colby v. Parkersburg Ins. Co., 37 W. Va.
789, 17 S. E. 303 (1893), with Staats v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 57 W. Va.
571, 50 S. E. 815 (1905). It is submitted that the mortgagee's Tight is that
of a creditor rather than that of a donee, and consequently he should not be
treated as a sole beneficiary.
20 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F.
(2d) 988 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937),
citing 2 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 357 and Haines v. Pacific Bancorporation,
146 Ore. 407, 30 P. (2d) 763 (1934).
2161 W. Va. 597, 57 S. E. 48 (1907).
2
2 Nutter v. Sydenstricker, 11 W. Va. 547 (1877) and Johnson v. McClung,
26 W. Va. 659 ( 1885). The Jenkins case was cited with approval in Lusk
v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932), noted in (1933) 39 W. VA.
L. Q. 266.
23 101 W. Va. 103, 132 S. E. 194 (1926).
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the plaintiff seeks to recover "under the authority of" the
statute.
The Jenkbis case has been variously commented upon by later

cases.

Thus, in Neil v. Flynn Lumber

Co.,24

the court said that

2'
the contract was made "for the mutual advantage of both parties
(the county court and the railway company) in an effort to
prevent the spread of a contagious disease". This language was
repeated in Hamilton, Admr'x v. Paint Creek, etc. Co., 2 the court
adding that "it was held (in the Jenkins case) that one of such
class of persons, in whose interest also the contract was made, may
maintain in his own name an action against the carrier ...... " if
these observations are sound, then a sole beneficiary right may be
created even though the contract was made for the "mutual
advantage" of the promisor and the promisee, or if the contract
was made by them "in the interest" of a person or class of persons.
Another group of cases involves insurance and indemnity
policies. In O'Neal v. PocahontasTransportationCo.,2 it was held
that a general automobile indemnity policy was not made for the
sole benefit of anyone who might be injured in the operation of
the car. And, in Criss v. United States F. & G. Co.,"- it was held
that no action would lie upon such a policy until and unless the
injured party has first obtained a judgment against the tort-feasor.
The court distinguished the Jenkins case upon the ground that
there the beneficiary's injuries arose out of the negligence of the
promisor.2 9 It was further said that the covenants in the policy
"are not for the sole beneft of the plaintiff or the class to
which she belongs". However, in Smith 'v. United States F. & G.
Co.,30 it was held that where the injured party had obtained a
judgment against the promisee, the former is permitted to maintain an action at law upon the policy. There was no discussion
24

71 WV.Va. 708, 77 S. E. 324 (1913).

25 Italics supplied. If this interpretation be correct, the infected persons
should probably be treated as incidental beneficiaries. In any view, it is difficult to see how they could be treated as sole beneficiaries.
2 103 W. Va. 402, 137 S. E. 535 (1927).
The expression is probably a
groping for the erroneous doctrine, sometimes applied to third party beneficiary contracts, that the beneficiary should be permitted to sue under "real
party in interest" statutes. See 2 WnIASTON, CONTRACTS, § 366.
27 99 W. Va. 456, 129 S. E. 478 (1925).
28 105 W. Va. 380, 142 S. E. 849 (1928).
29

It is submitted

that this is not a valid basis for distinction.

The ques-

tion is: who may sue, and in what forum, to recover damages for breach of
a contract to which he was not a partyg The manner of the breach, whether
negligent, wilful or otherwise, would seem to furnish no answer to this
question.
30 109 W. Va. 280, 153 S. E. 584 (1930).
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of the statute, nor were the O'Neal or Criss cases distinguished.
It is difficult to find a distinction between these cases upon the
basis of the definition of a sole beneficiary. It seems clear that,
the injured plaintiff is not a donee because the tort-feasor is also
interested in the discharge of his liability and
it was primarily
31
for this purpose that the contract was made.

Cases involving group insurance policies present the problem in another aspect, and most squarely raise the question of
whether "sole" is syonymous with "single". In Somog 'v.
West Virginia etc., Insurance Co.,1 2 an employee who had con-

tributed by wage deductions to the payment of the premium upon
a group policy was permitted to recover disability benefits in an
action at law. The present problem was not discussed. This was
followed by Johnson v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co.," in which the
court based the decision upon the ground that "he for whose
interest3" a promise is made, may maintain an action upon it;
though the promise be made to another and not to him". The
syllabus varies this by stating that "he for whose benefit" 5 a
promise is made may maintain an action. There was no discussion
of the statute and the only West Virginia case cited was Nutter
v. Sydenstricker,36 which is not in point. Finally, in the. recent
case of Watts v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,37 the court

tacitly affirmed the employee's right of action, by remanding the
case with permission to amend the declaration.
Since none of these cases cited or discussed the statute, they
cannot be considered as conclusively authoritative upon the question. However, they and the Jenkins case and those approving
it, have gone far to establish the doctrine that "sole" does not
mean "single". As applied to group insurance, it is arguable
that this conclusion does not necessarily follow, (especially where
the employees pay the premium in whole or in part) upon the
31 Notwithstanding that the policy may in terms provide for a direct enforceable right against the insurer (compare American Fidelity and Casualty
Co. v. Big Four Taxi Co., 111 W. Va. 462, 163 S. E. 40 (1932) applying CODE,
17-6-6) this alone does not determine the nature and incidents of that right,

or whether the injured party is a sole beneficiary and therefore entitled to
maintain an action at law. The sound view, it is submitted, is that of Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F. (2d) 988 ( C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
32110 W. Va. 205, 157 S.
33 112 W. Va. 396,
34 Italics supplied.

. 400 (1931).

164 S.E. 411 (1932).
The same language is used in Nutter v. Sydenstricker,
11 W. Va. 547 (1877).
35 Ibid.
3c 11 W. Va. 547 (1877), distinguished in Petty v. Warren, 90 W. Va. 397,
110 S. E. 826 (1922).
37 23 S. E. (2d) 923 (W. Va. 1943).
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ground that, in reality, the insurer has made as many separate
promises to the employer as there are employees, but to avoid
the inconvenience of issuing a separate policy evidencing each
promise, they have all been included in the one master policy.:
Each employee may then be treated as the "sole" or "single"
beneficiary of the separate promise made for his benefit. The
issuance of a certificate to each employee strengthens the realistic
basis for such a decision, and seems to be in consonance with the
actual intent of the parties. Manifestly, such considerations do
not apply with equal force to the indenmity insurance cases, nor
to situations such as that in the Jenkins case.
If, on the other hand, these cases be interpreted to mean
that a member of a designated class is a sole beneficiary, that conclusion must be reconciled with the decision in Standard Oil Co. of
N. J. v. Smith, et al."0 There, in an equity suit to recover upon a
subcontractor's bond, the defendant contended,. in effect, that the
plaintif's proper remedy was by an action at law. The court
held to the contrary, saying that the statute means "exactly what
it says . . . . The provision of the bond herein relative to the
payment of materiahnen and laborers is a covenant for their
primary benefit as a class. Because the covenant is for the protection of a class no one of whom has a distinctive right to the
4
benefit, an action at law is not permissible under the JoinsoiO
case. But we have repeatedly held that one of such a class could
proceed in equity for the benefit of himself and the other members
of his class."
The precedents are, then, in this position: in both group
insurance policies and in contractors' bonds the covenants are
for the protection of a class; but in the former each employee has
a "distinctive right to the benefit", while in the latter the materialman or laborer has no such right. And, this result is reached
in the former type of case by ignoring, and in the latter by applying, the provisions of a statute that is almost one hundred years
old and was not actually intended to apply to either specific
41
situation.
38 This view is here suggested only upon an argumentative basis. The
v,riter can perceive no real difference between one promise to render two or
more separate performances, and two promises, in the same contract, to render
such separate performances.
39 116 W. Va. 16, 178 S. E. 281 (1935).
40 Referring to Johnson v. McClung, 26 W. Va. 659 (1885).
41 Upon the assumption that the decision in Ross v. Milne gave rise to the

enactment of the statute.
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Thus, the propounded question: whether ",sole" is synonymous with "single", cannot be answered categorically. In sonic
cases it is, in others it is not.4 2 Yet, it is submitted, that the
court has arrived, by a sort of judicial intuition, at sound conclusions in both instances, whether the point be examined from the
standpoint .of statutory construction, the intent of the contracting
parties or the practical results to be achieved. The basis for the
distinction is this: that the legislature, in using the word "sole"
intended to deal with benefit of the promise as between the promisee
and t7he beneficiary,--not as between two or more beneficiaries.
In a word, it was intended to designate by the word "sole" a donee,
not necessarily as the recipient of a pure gift from the promisee,
but as the recipient of a performance which would result in the
discharge of no actual, supposed or asserted obligation owing by
the promisee to the beneficiary; nor would breach of the promise
occasion more than nominal damages to the promisec. At the
same time, performance would confer upon the beneficiary something to which he was not previously entitled." It is immaterial
that there axe two or more donees, whether designated by name
or as members of a class, for, as between themselves and the
promisee (donor) they are the sole beneficiaries within the mean44
ing of the statute.
This construction is also consonant with the intent of the
parties and with the practical consideration involved. Thus, in
situations such as that in the Jenkins case, or in the group insurance cases, there will not ordinarily be a total breach of the
contract as to all beneficiaries. It would be Lmjust and impolitic
to require an individual employee to resort to a court of equity
and deprive him of the very practical advantage of the right of
trial by a jury. Of course, if there has been a complete breach
of the master policy, or if the insurer has a defense applicable to
the entire contract, equity should take jurisdiction in order to
avoid a multiplicity of actions. On the other hand, there is ordinarily more than a single breach of a contractor's bond. A court
42 Compare the decisions in Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53
S. E. 24 (1905) and Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 309, 167
S. E. 737 (1933)-noted in (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 358-holding that the
word "al0" is unambiguous, with the decision in Hodge v. Garten, 116 W. Va.
564, 182 S. E. 582 (1935) holding that, under some circumstances, "all" may
mean "some".
See Hardman, A Problem in Interpretation (1936) 42 W. VA.
L. Q. 110. Cf. Light v. E. M. Grant & Co., 73 W. Va. 56, 79 S. E. 1011 (1913).
43 See RESTAT'lENT, COeMACTS § 133, quoted supra note 4.
44

In the language of the

RESTAmTET,

ibid., the determining factor is

the "purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise".
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of equity is a more convenient forum for the ascertainment of the
rights of the parties, and the promisee can and should be made
a party, since he has a pecuniary interest in the result of the case.
It is plainly the creditor-beneficiary type of contract under the
test here suggested, both because performance of the promise will
relieve the promisee of his own obligations to the materialman and
laborers, and because nonperformance will result in actual damages
to him.
There remain to be mentioned two recent cases in which it
is deferentially submitted, the court has used inaccurate language in reference to the statute.' 5 In Chitwood v. Collins, 4 the
court said: "Code, 55-8-12, permitting a suit in equity by third
persons upon a contract made for their benefit, does not specify
that they shall have furnished a consideration."
This statement
is incorrect because the cited statute provides that the sole beneficiary may maintain an action, not a suit in equity. The rights
of the plaintiffs in this case to specific performance of a contract
to make a will are enforceable in equity, not by virtue of the statute, but by virtue of the traditional powers of a court of equity to
47
grant the relief sought.
Again, in Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Monarch Smokeless Coal Co., et al.,48 the court said: "In Chitwood v. Collins....
it was held that a donee beneficiary of a contract between two other
persons could enforce that contract in equity for his own benefit.
This case would appear definitely to align this jurisdiction with
the many others which have sustained the enforceability by a
third person beneficiary of his rights in a contract between others.
45 The limits of this article do not permit of a discussion of all West Virginia cases dealing with the statute. For further cases, see RESTATEmENT,
CoNTercrs, W. VA. A NOT. (193S) § 133, et seq. Mention may, however, be
made of Delp v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 508, 182 S. E. 580
(1935), noted in (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 242. An insurance company had
issued a group policy to an employer, and having become insolvent, its assets
were sold to defendant which promised to carry out the obligations of the
policies. It was held that, notwithstanding that insolvency may have cancelled the policies, plaintiff employee may maintain an action at law. A
similar decision was rendered in Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Koegel. 104
Va. 619, 52 S. E. 166 (1905). The statute was not cited. The decision was
based upon the exception to the common law rule, viz., that the promisor may
be sued at law -here he has received money or property of the promisee and
agreed to deliver it to the third party. See AVLiSTON, CONTRACTS § § 348-360

and 370.

322 W. Va. 267, 8 S. E. (2d) 830 (1940).
138; Ralphsnyder v. Ralphsnyder, 17 W. Va.
28 (1880); Cooper v. Cooper, 65 W. Va. 712, 64 S. E. 927 (1909); Camden
v. Dewing, 47 W. Va. 310, 34 S. E. 911 (1899).
48 123 W. Va. 53, 14 S. E. (2d) 922 (1941).
40

47 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
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If a donee beneficiary can enforce such a contract, no reason is
perceived why a creditor beneficiary may not do so."
An uncritical application of this language would change
the existing law by permitting a donee beneficiary to resort to
equity in any case, notwithstanding the fact that he may have an
adequate remedy at law by virtue of the statute. 9 Furthermore,
this jurisdiction has for many years been aligned with the weight
of authority in sustaining the enforceability of third party beneficiary contracts, the only indefiniteness being to the proper forum
for their enforcement. Finally, this lanauage seems to rest the
creditor-beneficiary's right in equity upon analogy rather than
upon the numerous native precedents in point. 0
The foregoing observations are not made in a spirit of captiousness or quibbling. It is believed that sound decisions are
more likely to result from a due regard to the historical background of the common law, the statute and the distinctions made
in previous cases, than from reliance upon persuasive authorities
mihich did not have to wrestle with the definition of the word
"sole".
To sum up: Practically all the West Virginia cases can be
reconciled by limiting the operation of the statute to cases of the
donee type of contract-keeping in mind the special senses in
which the word "donee" is used. This is not, however, offered
as a panacea for the ills for which the statute may be responsible. It is possible, for example, to make a contract whereby A
promises B (1) to pay a debt owing to C by B, and (2) to make
an additional payment as a gift to C. Here, C is the creditor beneficialy of the first promise and the donee beneficiary-the "sole"
beneficiary--of the second. If A pays the debt but fails to pay
the gift, it is submitted that C should have the right to recover
in an action at law, although it would be doing considerable violence to language to say that C is the "sole" beneficiary of A's
promise, unless it be held that one promise to render two performances is, in legal effect, two separate promises.
The ideal solution is an amendment to the statute, similar
to that made in Virginia." Until that fortunate occurrence, the
court will doubtless continue to struggle with the problem.
49

See discussion supra, note 12.

r-oSupra, mote 13.

and if a covenant or promise be made for
51 VA. CODE (1919) § 5143; "...
the benefit, in whole or in part, of a person with whom it is not made", eto.
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